Libya

Without widespread support from locals, most Salafi-jihadi movements have not been able to expand rapidly. Yet they have been able to maintain safe havens, even under significant pressure like ISIS was in late 2016 and into 2017. Competing poles of power—Hifter in the east and militias nominally aligned with the G.N.A. and in the west—have fought ISIS in Benghazi and Sirte, respectively, to gain international support as primary counterterrorism partners. But after pro-G.N.A. forces worked with the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to successfully dislodge ISIS from its Sirte headquarters, denying it territorial control in Libya, factions have competed for power instead of uniting to eliminate common enemies. This infighting has allowed ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups to evolve and grow in late 2016 and 2017.

ISIS could turn into a group with similar attributes to al-Qaeda affiliates in the area. Al-Qaeda affiliates also remain in a strong financial position, especially compared with ISIS today, because of their relationships with Libya’s black market economy, institutionalized over decades. Political opposition to the Salafi-jihadi movements is also weak. The defunct government in Tripoli that still attempts to undermine the G.N.A. has defended Ansar al-Shariah, protesting its designation as an international terrorist organization in 2014. Hifter’s supporters have accused rivals of providing material support to these groups in Benghazi, particularly by sea, infighting allowed ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups to evolve and grow in late 2016 and 2017. Libya’s Terrorism Challenge 15 via Misrata. They have also tried to link powerful rivals from Misrata to terrorist activity. Hifter’s campaigns in Benghazi and Derna led to the deaths and capture of many al-Qaeda affiliated leaders, but disunity has prevented the total expulsion of these groups after over three years of fighting.